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Abstract According to the parent analogy, as a caretaker’s goodness, ability and
intelligence increase, the likelihood that the caretaker will make arrangements for
the attainment of future goods that are unnoticed or underappreciated by their
dependents also increases. Consequently, if this analogy accurately represents our
relationship to God, then we should expect to find many instances of inscrutable evil
in the world. This argument in support of skeptical theism has recently been criti-
cized by Dougherty. I argue that Dougherty’s argument is incomplete, for there are
two plausible ways of construing the parent analogy’s conclusion. I supplement
Dougherty’s case by offering a new argument against the parent analogy based on
failed expectations concerning the amount of inscrutable evils encountered in the
world. Consequently, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical
theism to overcome if it is to maintain its status as a defeater for our reliability when
tracking gratuitous evils.
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Defenses of skeptical theism attempt to establish two fundamental points
concerning our evidence for the existence of gratuitous evil. First, they establish
that we have a defeater for the reliability of such evidence, and second, they
establish, by appeal to some theory of defeat, the type and degree of defeat
conferred by skeptical theistic considerations.
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In this paper, I ignore the question concerning the type and degree of defeat
involved with skeptical theism.1 Instead, I focus on a particular argument for the
conclusion that skeptical theism confers a defeater of some sort on anyone who
entertains skeptical theism; namely, the parent analogy. I argue that the parent
analogy fails in this strong aim.
In what follows, I present the parent analogy as an analogical argument2
followed by a criticism of it due to Trent Dougherty. I then go on to argue that
there are two plausible interpretations of the conclusion at which skeptical theists,
such as Stephen Wykstra, aim. The first interpretation, which Dougherty calls
Obscurity, leads us to expect that most of the sufferings we encounter in the world
would be inscrutable to us, were theism true. I call the second interpretation
Obscurity Light. That thesis leads us to expect that many, rather than most, of the
sufferings we encounter would be inscrutable to us, were theism true. Dougherty’s
criticisms, though apt, only target the stronger thesis: Obscurity. As a result, if the
parent analogy is employed in support of the weaker conclusion, Obscurity Light,
Dougherty’s critique fails to hit its target. In other words, Dougherty’s criticisms
are incomplete as they stand, for they fail to address this alternative interpretation
of the parent analogy. Lastly, in ‘‘The Parent Analogy Exonerated?—Deeper
Issues’’, I supplement Dougherty’s original argument by offering a new criticism of
the parent analogy understood as supporting Obscurity Light. What results is a two-
pronged argument according to which the parent analogy fails, whether it is
advanced in support of Obscurity or Obscurity Light. Thus, the fundamental goal
of the parent analogy, which is to motivate the acceptance of skeptical theism as an
epistemic defeater for reasonable belief in the existence of gratuitous evils, is not
attained.
The parent analogy
Perhaps it is best to begin with one of the earliest statements of the parent analogy:
A modest proposal might be that [God’s] wisdom is to ours, roughly as an
adult human’s is to a 1 month old infant’s. (You may adjust the ages and
species to fit your own estimate of how close our knowledge is to
omniscience.) If such goods as this exist, it might not be unlikely that we
should discern some of them: even a 1 month old infant can perhaps discern,
in [his] inarticulate way, some of the purposes of his mother in her dealings
with him. But if outweighing goods of the sort at issue exist in connection with
1 Though, for some recent and interesting discussion on this issue, see Dougherty (2014, pp. 21–31) and
Matheson (2014, pp. 3–20).
2 I have heard some people lament that there is no argument in favor of the parent analogy. I think this
trivially true, and moreover, I think it’s an odd sort of criticism since, as I understand the analogy, it is an
argument. And thus, the fact that there aren’t any arguments in support of the parent analogy argument is
unsurprising. Arguments aren’t directly supported by other arguments unless we’re speaking fairly
loosely. More carefully, the premises of arguments are supported by further arguments with those
premises as their conclusions. Or at least, so things seem to me.
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instances of suffering, that we should discern most of them seems about as
likely as that a 1 month old should discern most of his parents’ purposes for
those pains they allow him to suffer—which is to say, it is not likely at all.3
The thoughts detailed in the above paragraph derive from a very natural intuition;
namely, that God’s cognitive capacities vastly outrun our own and that the way in
which God’s cognitive capacities do this is not unlike the way in which a parent’s
cognitive capacities outrun the cognitive capacities of their infant children. Despite
the naturalness of this thought, if we are to fully understand the parent analogy’s
value as an argument for skeptical theism, it is best to formulate it as a piece of
analogical reasoning.4
In order to present the parent analogy as an argument, then, let us begin by
identifying the four basic parts of any analogical argument. They are:
(i) the source domain (S)—i.e. some state of affairs with which we are
familiar,
(ii) the target domain (T)—i.e. some state of affairs with which we are less
familiar,
(iii) a set of properties (P) accepted as held in common by the source and target
domains, and
(iv) some further property or set of properties (Q) that allegedly hold of T since
they are known to hold of S and follow (in some relevant way) from the
instantiation of P in S.5
For the strongest version6 of the parent analogy, we can identify these parts of the
analogical argument in the following way:
(S) The state of affairs of a parent permitting the suffering of their 10 year old
child7
(T) The state of affairs of God permitting our suffering
(P) The following set of three properties:
(a) being such that as the guardian’s degree of goodness, G, increases, so
increases the likelihood that the guardian will make arrangements for
future benefits concerning their dependents.
(b) being such that as the guardian’s degree of ability, A, increases, so
increases the likelihood that the guardian will be able to bring about
3 (Wykstra 1984, pp. 155–6).
4 In personal conversation, Linda Zagzebski has suggested that any formalized version of such analogies
is less plausible than the bare analogical intuition underlying the argument. Thus, if someone were to
reject the analogical argument for some reason, that same reason may not suffice for rejecting the analogy
as a whole. For something similar with respect to reformed epistemology and natural theology, cf. (Evans
2012).
5 See Copi (2010) for the basic structure of analogical argumentation as I present it above. See also
Ribeiro (2014) for a valuable interdisciplinary discussion of the merit of analogical argumentation.
6 I’m bypassing some back-and-forth history concerning this argument by simply presenting a version of
the argument that’s been modified to avoid earlier criticisms.
7 Sennett (1993, p. 226) presents reasons for increasing the age of the child in question to sidestep a
criticism from Rowe (1996, p. 275).
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whatever future-oriented arrangements they’ve made for their
dependents.
(c) being such that as the guardian’s degree of intelligence, I, increases, so
increases the likelihood that the future-oriented goods for which the
guardian has arranged will be either unnoticed or underappreciated (in
terms of value) by their dependents.8
(Q) being inscrutable but in fact morally permissible
To put this in analogical argument form, then, we have the Parent Analogy Argument:
1. The state of affairs of a parent permitting the suffering of their child (S) is
similar to the state of affairs of God permitting our suffering (T) with respect
to (P): (a) as G increases, so increases the likelihood that a guardian will
make arrangements concerning future goods for the benefit of their
dependents; (b) as A increases, so increases the likelihood that a guardian
will succeed in bringing about their future-oriented arrangements; and (c) as
I increases, so increases the likelihood that such future-oriented goods will
be inscrutable to dependents.
2. Oftentimes, the state of affairs of a parent permitting the suffering of their
child has the further property of (Q): being inscrutable but in fact morally
permissible.
3. Therefore, oftentimes the state of affairs of God permitting our suffering has
the further property of (Q): being inscrutable but in fact morally
permissible.
Put informally, the reasoning of the Parent Analogy Argument is as follows. The
greater some guardian’s degree of goodness, ability, and intelligence, the more
likely it is it that the guardian will permit current suffering which is necessary for
goods in the future. And the greater the disparity of intelligence of the guardian over
and above the dependents, the more likely it is that these future goods will be
obscure to (i.e. unnoticed or underappreciated by) the dependents. Moreover, we see
this state of affairs playing out in rather mundane ways regularly, as when a parent
allows their child to fail at a sport for the sake of developing tenacity or when
parents withhold current luxuries from their children for the sake of saving for a
college education. Children often fail to appreciate the importance of such matters,
but such failed appreciation on the part of a child hardly makes us doubt the
goodness and wisdom of parents. Thus, we should not doubt the goodness and
wisdom of God in the face of inscrutable (i.e. apparently gratuitous) suffering any
more than we doubt a parent’s goodness and wisdom in relevantly similar
circumstances.
8 Wykstra (1996, pp. 126–51) lays out the three properties articulated in this version of the parent
analogy argument.
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Dougherty: transparency, obscurity and obscurity light
There is a worry, however, which has been aptly stated by Trent Dougherty. He
argues that what is truly at issue when assessing the parent analogy is which of the
following incompatible theses is rendered more probable by the considerations of
the parent analogy.
Obscurity If the world is made by an omnipotent, omniscient God, then it is
highly likely that if evil is permitted, most of the goods for the sake of which it
is permitted will be obscure to humans.
Transparency If the world is made by an omnipotent, omniscient God, then it
is highly likely that if evil is permitted, then most of the goods for the sake of
which it is permitted will be transparent to humans.9,10
Dougherty argues that if skeptical theism is to succeed in establishing that there
is a defeater for the reliability of one’s experience of apparently gratuitous evil
when it comes to identifying actually gratuitous evil, then the parent analogy must
support Obscurity over Transparency (where Obscurity is equivalent to my Q in the
parent analogy of the previous section). And so conversely, if the parent analogy
supports the truth of Transparency over Obscurity, then skeptical theism will be in
trouble. To understand why, think about which types of disputants concerning the
problem of evil would support a thesis like Transparency. There are at least two
types of interlocutors that come immediately to mind. First, anyone who simply
finds themselves with the intuition that skeptical theism is false (i.e. what I call an
‘anti-Agnostic’)11 will likely find themselves in a position to think that Obscurity is
improbable given the parent analogy. Second, anyone who defends theodicies of
various sorts will likewise defend Transparency. Theodicists take themselves to be
able to identify the goods (or types of goods) for the sake of which various evils are
permitted, and they assume that they can do so in a reliable way (i.e. given
sufficiently earnest and sustained attempts to find such goods). But to engage in the
project of identifying the possible goods to which apparently gratuitous evils might
lead is to engage in a project deemed likely to fail by any skeptical theist. Thus,
engaging in theodicy (loosely)12 implies that one accepts Transparency.
9 (Dougherty 2012, p. 20).
10 Dougherty calls this Strong Transparency. It is the thesis he is concerned with in the article, and
although he states it as, ‘‘the goods for the sake of which it is permitted will usually be transparent to
humans,’’ I prefer to replace ‘usually’ with the, to my tastes, more lucid ‘most’ (Ibid., 20; italics mine). In
either case, at least 50 % seems to be the intended meaning.
11 In Howard-Snyder (2009, pp. 17–18), Howard-Snyder expresses his preference for the label
‘Agnosticism’ as a replacement for ‘skeptical theism’ given various misgivings with the more common
label. I understand the misgivings, and at least for the purposes of identifying those who have
contradictory intuitions concerning skeptical hypotheses of skeptical theism, I’ll use his label with the
added ‘anti-’ to express the point.
12 I say ‘loosely’ because someone might engage in theodicy as a back-up plan in case their skeptical
theistic intuitions are wrong. Usually, however, such a person would, properly speaking, be engaging in
defense since, as I intend to use the term, such projects do not require that we can pick out the actual
goods for which some evils are permitted. Allow me, then, to simply register that I take the project of
defense to be consistent with sufficiently weak construals of skeptical theism, whereas I take theodicy to
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Now, here is the problem as Dougherty succinctly summarizes it in terms of the
above theses:
The central problem for [the skeptical theist’s] expanded defense of the Parent
Analogy is that even if it is true that ability to plan for the future will increase
in proportion to the scale of the three properties he mentions, the probability of
Transparency will also increase in proportion to the scale of those three
properties. (Or at least it is at least as plausible that the latter will as that the
former will.) This completely undercuts the usefulness of the Parent Analogy
to support Obscurity. For the more benevolent a being, the more they would
want sufferers to understand the reasons for which they are permitted to suffer.
And the more wisdom they had, the more likely they would know how to do it.
And the more power they had, the more likely they would be able to make it
happen.13
Thus, as Dougherty understands the parent analogy, it only establishes a good
argument for skeptical theism if the probability of Obscurity given the parent
analogy is greater than the probability of Transparency given the parent analogy.
But at best, he thinks, both theses end up equally probable given the parent analogy,
and so, the argument cannot support skeptical theism over its competitors (i.e. anti-
Agnostics or theodicists).
I agree with Dougherty that as he’s presented the argument,14 the parent analogy
fails to support skeptical theism; however, there are two importantly different ways
of understanding the conclusion of the parent analogy. The first way, which
Dougherty adopts, is to equate the conclusion with Obscurity. The second way of
understanding the conclusion, however, is subtly (though not insignificantly)
different. Consider the following premise from Stephen Wykstra (i.e. Dougherty’s
main interlocutor and the primary defender of the parent analogy), which most
closely resembles Obscurity:
Obscurity Light—It is likely that the goods for which O [i.e. an omni-God]
permits many sufferings are beyond our ken.15
Footnote 12 continued
not be similarly consistent. For an example of an author who uses ‘theodicy’ as equivalent to my use of
‘defense’, see Hasker (2011, p. 302).
13 Dougherty, ‘‘reconsidering the parent analogy,’’ 23.
14 It is perhaps worth pointing out that Dougherty’s criticisms of the parent analogy are importantly
different from William Rowe’s—see Rowe, ‘‘The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look,’’
275-276, (Rowe 2001, pp. 130–131). The first difference is this: Rowe’s reverse parent analogy proceeds
from the set of all inscrutable evils, whereas Dougherty and the original parent analogy argument proceed
from the set of all evils. Thus, Rowe is presenting an altogether different argument rather than contesting
the conclusion of the first argument. The second difference is this: Dougherty takes the considerations of
the parent analogy to simply support the negation of the intended conclusion of the original parent
analogy, whereas Rowe concerns himself in the reverse parent analogy with a conclusion concerning
God’s offering assurance of love to the one suffering. What’s really happening in Rowe, then, is that he’s
not really criticizing the original parent analogy, but rather, redirecting us to a different argument.
Dougherty prefers to remain focused on the merit, or lack thereof, of the original argument.
15 Wykstra, ‘‘Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,’’ 140; italics are mine. In Wykstra’s text, this
thesis is simply called (2). I’ve renamed it ‘Obscurity Light’ to avoid confusion in my text.
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And now, compare Wykstra’s Obscurity Light with Dougherty’s Obscurity:
Obscurity—If the world is made by an omnipotent, omniscient God, then it is
highly likely that if evil is permitted, most of the goods for the sake of which it
is permitted will be obscure to humans.16,17
Notice the presence of the word ‘many’ in Obscurity Light. Wykstra is not
necessarily claiming that we should expect most of the evils we encounter to be
inscrutable as Obscurity states. His claim, and the claim of skeptical theists, is
plausibly much weaker. They only require that many of the evils encountered in the
world turn out to be inscrutable. And this is not insignificant, for if Obscurity Light
indeed represents the intended conclusion of the parent analogy, then Dougherty’s
claim that Transparency is more probable than Obscurity will be beside the point,
for while Obscurity is inconsistent with Transparency, Obscurity Light is not. And
thus, even if Dougherty is correct to think that Transparency is supported by the
considerations advanced in the parent analogy, Obscurity Light could simultane-
ously be well supported by those same considerations.
Moreover, Obscurity Light does seem reasonably well supported by the parent
analogy, for surely there would be some cases, as I suggested earlier, where children
simply fail to appreciate the value of some future good for which they are currently
suffering, even if most of the time such children do see the reasons for which their
parents permit their suffering. As a result, as long as we can think of at least two
dozen (or so…)18 instances of this sort of arrangement, then that would suffice to
justify the analogical argument Wykstra advances in support of Obscurity Light,
even if Transparency were well supported as well.
So what does this alternative interpretation of the strength of the parent analogy’s
conclusion imply concerning Dougherty’s argument? Only that his argument is
incomplete, for it is not entirely unreasonable to read Wykstra’s description of the
parent analogy as supporting the stronger thesis, Obscurity,19 and if a skeptical
theist were to advance the parent analogy in this way, then Dougherty’s criticisms
would indeed be apt. However, for Dougherty’s criticisms to fully remove the
power of the parent analogy to motivate skeptical theism, further scrutiny must be
directed towards an Obscurity Light construal of the parent analogy. To this we now
turn.
16 I’ve added the italics to bring out the salient contrast.
17 It is worth reminding ourselves that there are several cognitive limitations that might render an evil
inscrutable from the perspective of an individual. One important such limitation manifests when an agent
fails to realize that a token good belongs to some good-type that would be sufficient to morally justify the
permission of the relevant evil. For an earlier articulation of this point, see Alvin Plantinga, ‘‘Epistemic
Probability and Evil,’’ Archivo di filosofia 56 (1988): 557-84; Reprinted in Howard-Snyder, Daniel (ed.)
The Evidential Argument from Evil (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996): 69–96.
18 For the phrase, see Plantinga (2007, pp. 203–228) for the inspiration.
19 Simply reread the Wykstra quotation at the start of this section and ask yourself whether Obscurity or
Obscurity Light best explains the way in which Wykstra frames the parent analogy there.
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The parent analogy exonerated?—deeper issues
As I have represented Dougherty’s argument, it leaves a way out for proponents of
the parent analogy. Nevertheless, this apparent way out does not come without some
serious difficulties, which I detail in this final section. In brief, I offer an argument
against the adequacy of the parent analogy to motivate skeptical theism due to the
problem of failed expectations.
In my experience, the sufferings of this world are commonly inscrutable. Indeed,
sufferings ranging from interpersonal rudeness to overwhelming systemic injustices
seem largely inscrutable most of the time. Thus, if skeptical theism is to succeed in
addressing the worries articulated by various forms of the evidential argument from
evil for me, I would need not only a reason to expect that many sufferings would be
inscrutable given theism, but also a reason to expect that most sufferings would be
inscrutable given theism. Thus, even if the parent analogy succeeds in supporting
the truth of Obscurity Light, skeptical theism fails to be a live option for me on such
a meager basis. For given my own background evidence, there is a mismatch
between what the parent analogy leads me to expect (i.e. that no more than many
sufferings would be inscrutable, given theism) and what I actually find when
consulting my evidence (i.e. that most suffering falls within the inscrutable variety).
The following, then, is an argument that someone with similar reflections to my own
might readily endorse, one which renders the parent analogy unhelpful under the
Obscurity Light construal:
A. If the parent analogy is sufficient to motivate skeptical theism and
theism is true, then the world we live in is nothing more than an
Obscurity Light world.
B. But our world is an Obscurity world (i.e. more than an Obscurity Light
world).
C. Therefore, either the parent analogy does not suffice to motivate
skeptical theism or theism is false.
My reflections above concerning the amount of inscrutable evil support the truth
of (B). Moreover, (A) is implicitly accepted by skeptical theists such as Wykstra.20
So, if a skeptical theist wants to respond to this argument, she should do so by
consulting her own acquaintance with the quantity and distribution of
inscrutable evil in the world. And perhaps if she does so, she will find that, in
her own experience, (B) is false. That is, perhaps a skeptical theist will find that her
evidence concerning the amount of inscrutable evil is simply different from my
evidence concerning inscrutable evil, and if this is so, then she would surely be
epistemically rational in accepting the parent analogy.
However, this conclusion should hold little comfort for the skeptical theist.
Firstly, the parent analogy stands as the only positive argument for accepting
20 Perhaps someone might resist this and claim that skeptical theists, in some cases, do want to support
Obscurity, rather than just Obscurity Light, on the basis of the parent analogy, as noted above. If someone
were to take this road, then Dougherty’s argument would become relevant since this is just the sort of
person he was originally targeting.
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skeptical theism as a defeater for the reliability of our experiences of inscrutable evil
as trackers of gratuitous evil. Thus, if it fails, then skeptical theists have no positive
reason for assenting to the theses they advance.21 Secondly, notice that the above
argument can be run without committing to the truth or falsity of the characteristic
skeptical theist’s claim that experiences of inscrutable evil are evidentially
irrelevant to whether or not an evil is gratuitous. The evidence for the truth of
(B) concerns our ability to pick out inscrutable evil rather than our ability to pick
out gratuitous evil, and plausibly, we have the best access available (or at least,
sufficiently good access) to whether evils are inscrutable to us. As a result, the
argument cannot be rightly criticized for begging the question against skeptical
theism.
What can be gleaned from all this? Fundamentally, this shows that whether or not
skeptical theism can be sufficiently motivated for an individual will depend on some
personal and honest reflection concerning the amount of inscrutable suffering in the
world. Perhaps this will allow some individuals to rationally accept skeptical theism
on the basis of the parent analogy, but given the way the world actually is, it seems
unlikely that many people would be able to adopt skeptical theism on that basis. As
a result, even though Dougherty’s argument fails to undermine the parent analogy
on its own, when supplemented by the above considerations concerning failed
expectations, there remains a significant empirical hurdle for skeptical theists to
overcome.
Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that Dougherty’s criticism of the parent analogy was
incomplete since it only addressed one of two reasonable interpretations of the
strength of the conclusion of the parent analogy. After highlighting the difference
between these two interpretations of the parent analogy, Obscurity and Obscurity
Light, I advanced my own criticism of the latter interpretation concerning the
problem of failed expectations. According to that criticism, while it is possible for
some philosophers (e.g. Wykstra) to expect a low degree of inscrutable evil and find
evidence matching that expectation, in most cases, the parent analogy leads to a
mismatch between (i) the way one would expect the world to appear, given theism
and (ii) how the world actually appears. For those who perceive such a mismatch,
there must either be other considerations yet unrevealed in support of skeptical
theism or they should give up the view altogether.22
21 Or at least, skeptical theists will not have any positive argument for accepting those theses. Whether or
not they might have a reason depends on further considerations dealing with rationality that are beyond
the scope of this paper.
22 I would like to thank an anonymous referee whose feedback resulted in a much improved paper.
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